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THE CHEVRON TWO-STEP AND THE TOYOTA
SIDESTEP: DANCING AROUND THE EEOC'S
"DISABILITY" REGULATIONS UNDER THE ADA
Lisa Eichhorn*
The definition of "disability" is among the most frequently
litigated issues under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") because the statute protects only individuals with
disabilities. The ADA defines a disability, in part, as an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ["EEOC"] has
issued a regulation further defining the term "substantially
limits" for purposes of the ADA's employment-related
provisions. Although the EEOC's regulation is the product of a
valid rulemaking process and is entitled to a high degree of
deference under settled administrative law principles, the
Supreme Court, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky,
Inc. v. Williams, recently sidestepped the regulation altogether
and applied the Court's own, narrower, interpretation of the
term "substantially limits" in assessing whether an employee's
difficulty in performing manual tasks rendered her disabled
under the ADA.
The Toyota Court did not invalidate the EEOC regulation, but
the Court's sidestep around the EEOC language has effectively
and inappropriately narrowed the ADA disability definition,
especially now that several circuit courts have applied Toyota's
interpretation of "substantially limits" to cases involving a
broad range of major life activities. Nevertheless, in cases
where the difference between the EEOC's and the Toyota
Court's interpretation of "substantially limits" makes all the
difference, some hope remains for plaintiffs who wish to assert
ADA claims. Because the EEOC regulation remains valid,
because Toyota-in some circuits-can still be limited to its
facts, and because other prongs of the statutory disability
definition may suffice as a source of coverage, individuals
whose impairments significantly affect the manner in which
* Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. The
author would like to thank Professor Richard Seamon for his extremely helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
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they go about their lives may still find ways of invoking the
ADA's protections.
I. INTRODUCTION
Much fanfare accompanied the passage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 19901 ("ADA"), which, in President George H.W.
Bush's words, promised to "open up all aspects of American life to
individuals with disabilities. 2  Perhaps most significant among
those aspects of American life is the realm of private employment.3
The ADA's text contains express congressional findings that people
with disabilities face persistent discrimination in employment4 and
that the "Nation's proper goals" should include the assurance of
"economic self-sufficiency" for such individuals.5 In response to
these findings, Title I of the ADA prohibits certain private
employers6 from discriminating on the basis of disability with
respect to "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."'
By extending its coverage to private employers, the ADA
significantly expands upon the protections offered by an older
statute, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973," which prohibits disability-
based discrimination in federally-funded programs and activities.9
To facilitate this expansion of rights into the private sector,
Congress authorized the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") to issue regulations implementing Title I of
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). For accounts of the history of the
disability rights movement and events leading to the ADA's passage, see
generally FRED PELKA, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1997); JOSEPH P.
SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (1993).
2. Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1070 (July 26, 1990).
3. While the ADA also protects individuals with disabilities from
discrimination on the part of public entities, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and public
accommodations, § 12182(a), most of the reported ADA cases concern the
statute's employment provisions, § 12112(a). See Ruth Colker, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99,
100 n.7 (1999) (noting that employment discrimination cases constituted 76
percent of the author's database of appellate decisions applying the ADA).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).
5. § 12101(a)(8).
6. Title I applies generally to employers with fifteen or more employees.
See § 12111(5)(A).
7. § 12112(a).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961 (2000).
9. Id. § 794(a).
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the ADA within a year of the statute's passage.'" The EEOC
responded with an extensive set of administrative rules" describing
types of prohibited conduct, 12 defenses available to employers,' 3 and,
most significantly, an elucidation of the ADA's statutory definition
of "disability."'4 Because an ADA plaintiff must prove the existence
of a "disability" as a threshold matter in order to pursue an
employment discrimination claim," hundreds of federal opinions
have relied upon the EEOC's disability regulations to determine
whether a given plaintiff is disabled and thus covered by the
16statute. Within the disability regulations, courts have relied
particularly on the EEOC's explanation of the term "substantially
limits" 1 because the statutory text defines a disability as an
impairment that "substantially limits" a major life activity but does
not define that two-word phrase.'"
In the last four years, the United States Supreme Court has
twice questioned the validity of the disability regulations
promulgated by the EEOC. First, in 1999, a majority of the Court in
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,'9 noted that no agency was given
authority to interpret the term "disability,"20 whose definition
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
11. Regulations to Implement the Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 (2003)). These regulations, like Title I itself, became effective on July
26, 1992. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (specifying Title I's effective date as being
twenty-four months after the Act's passage on July 26, 1990); 56 Fed. Reg.
35,726 (July 26, 1991) (specifying the regulations' effective date as July 26,
1992).
12. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.4-1630.13 (2003).
13. See id. § 1630.15.
14. See id. § 1630.2(g)-(l).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (protecting only "a qualified individual with a
disability" from employment discrimination).
16. This author's Westlaw search for federal cases citing the EEOC's
disability regulation, conducted on June 23, 2003, turned up 1,916 opinions.
Indeed, the threshold issue of whether a plaintiff in an ADA suit is in fact
disabled is one of the most frequently litigated questions under the statute; one
expert noted in 1998 that the issue arose in more than 50 percent of the ADA
cases being litigated at the time. See Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights:
Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment Discrimination and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 303 (2000) (noting that the
most common defense in ADA employment cases is the assertion that the
plaintiff is not disabled).
17. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). A Westlaw search performed by the author on
October 23, 2003, revealed 1,630 cases citing this specific EEOC regulation.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
19. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
20. Id. at 479.
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appears in an introductory section of the ADA rather than in any
specific title of the statute.2' Three years later, in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,22 the Court went a step
further. While not explicitly invalidating the EEOC's regulations
defining disability, a unanimous Court substituted its own more
restrictive interpretation of "substantially limits" for the EEOC's
definition of that element.23 Thus, while ostensibly sidestepping the
issue of the regulations' validity, the Toyota Court implicitly
invalidated a critical aspect of the EEOC's disability regulations, at
least in the context of the case before it. And the Court's sidestep
has caught on. In the past year, several federal circuit courts have
applied the Court's restrictive interpretation of "substantially
limits" in a broad variety of contexts, while not explicitly
invalidating the EEOC's definition of that same term.24
This Article argues that Toyota's implicit invalidation of the
EEOC's "substantially limits" regulation is based upon a misreading
of the regulation itself, and that Toyota, through its ripple effects in
the federal circuits, has resulted in an inappropriate restriction of
the statutory definition of disability. Part II traces the origins of the
EEOC's disability regulations, including the "substantially limits"
regulation, and explains the regulatory gloss that the EEOC has
placed upon the ADA's definition of disability. Part III defends the
validity of the disability regulations by analyzing the Supreme
Court's discussion of that issue in Sutton and by invoking principles
of deference derived from Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.25 Part IV then explains how the Court in
Toyota inappropriately ignored the EEOC's "substantially limits"
regulation and instead developed its own more restrictive
interpretation of that term. Part V analyzes what has been lost
through this new interpretation, and what could still be lost as the
effect of Toyota works its way through the lower courts. Lastly, Part
VI offers some suggestions for salvaging what remains of the
EEOC's "substantially limits" regulation after Toyota.
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining "disability"). Title I of the ADA
begins at section 12111.
22. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
23. Id. at 196-98.
24. See, e.g., Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 713-15
(8th Cir. 2003) (analyzing whether plaintiff was substantially limited in the
major life activity of caring for himself); EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306
F.3d 794, 802-03 (9th Cir. 2002) (analyzing whether individuals were
substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing).
25. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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II. INVITATION TO THE DANCE: ORIGINS OF THE ADA'S DISABILITY
DEFINITION AND OF THE EEOC'S DISABILITY REGULATIONS
Plaintiffs pursuing discrimination claims under the ADA must
prove as a threshold matter that they belong to the statutorily
protected class of people with disabilities. 26  The ADA defines
"disability" in terms of three alternatives:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities [of the person in question];
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment .
This definition has its origins in the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,28 whose section 504 prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability in programs and activities that receive federal financial
assistance.29 In 1974, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to
add a definition of "handicapped individual" (which has since been
26. Title I of the ADA, which covers the employment context, specifically
prohibits discrimination only against "a qualified individual with a disability."
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Title II, which covers public services, programs, and
activities, contains identical language. Id. § 12132. While Title III, which
covers public accommodations, is not phrased in terms of a "qualified individual
with a disability," plaintiffs must still prove their disabled status in order to
pursue a claim under this provision. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,
630-47 (1998) (analyzing, as a threshold matter, whether the plaintiff in a Title
III action had a disability).
Scholars have criticized the limitations imposed by the ADA's inclusion of
a defined protected class. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with
Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights
Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 441-44 (1991) (criticizing the
"protected-class" structure of the ADA's protections); Lisa Eichhorn, Major
Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of the
"Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 1405, 1473 (1999) (advocating statutory amendment to eliminate the
protected class requirement, so that plaintiffs need only prove discrimination
"on the basis of disability"). Nevertheless, Congress is unlikely to eliminate the
protected class requirement any time soon. See Lisa Eichhorn, Applying the
ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases: A Choice of Statutory Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1071, 1120 (1999) [hereinafter Eichhorn, Mitigating Measures] ("[G]iven the
lingering public belief in a class of 'truly' disabled people, Congress never had
the political will to [eliminate the protected class provision] and will probably
not muster such will in the near future."); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme
Court's Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52
ALA. L. REV. 321, 373 (2000) ("Given the current political climate, in which
there is a great dissatisfaction with civil rights laws in general ... and ... with
the ADA in particular, new congressional discussions about the ADA might well
lead to a reduction in the protections granted by the Act rather than an
expansion ....").
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
28. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961.
29. Id. § 794(a).
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changed to "individual with a disability" ' ) specifically applicable to
section 504.31 This definition speaks in terms of three alternative
prongs: It describes an individual who has "a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more ... major life
activities," a "record of such an impairment," or the experience of
being "regarded as having such an impairment., 32 In developing this
three-pronged structure, Congress took account of the fact that
disability discrimination can be based upon actual current
impairments, past diagnoses (or misdiagnoses) of impairments, and
non-existent but perceived impairments.
Over a decade later, when the ADA drafters were designing a
new statute to extend the prohibition on disability-based
discrimination to the private sector, they borrowed the
Rehabilitation Act's three-pronged disability definition as a matter
of political expediency.34 The drafters correctly calculated that
Congress would likely accept the familiar definition, which had
caused few problems since its addition to the Rehabilitation Act.35
As a result of the borrowed language, the Rehabilitation Act is an
important reference point in interpreting the ADA's disability
definition.
Regulations issued under the Rehabilitation Act also play a
30. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, §
102, 106 Stat. 4346, 4349 (1992) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)
(2000)). This change responded to the fact that by the early 1990s, many people
with disabilities had come to view the word "handicapped" as demeaning. See
ROBERT L. BURGDORF JR., DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 17
(1995).
31. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a),
88 Stat. 1617, 1619 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)
(2000)).
32. Id.
33. See S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 38-39 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389-90.
34. See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 127-29 (2000) (discussing the ADA drafters'
decision to rely upon the Rehabilitation Act's definition of disability).
35. See Feldblum, supra note 34, at 128-29; see also H.R. REP. 101-485, pt.
3, at 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 450 (noting that the
Rehabilitation Act's three-prong disability definition "has worked well since it
was adopted"). Early section 504 cases seldom raised the issue of whether
plaintiff was, in fact, a "handicapped individual." See Mary Crossley, The
Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 623 (1999) (noting that the
issue was "rarely litigated"); see also Feldblum, supra note 34, at 106-13
(reviewing early case law). Instead, the cases tended to focus on whether the
alleged discrimination had occurred because of the plaintiffs disability.
Feldblum, supra note 34, at 106.
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significant role in elucidating the definition of disability in the ADA.
Indeed, the ADA explicitly provides that its protections extend at
least as far as the protections offered by Title V of the Rehabilitation• • 36
Act and its accompanying regulations. More specifically, the ADA's
legislative history provides that the analysis of the term
"handicapped individual"37 appearing in regulations accompanying
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act should also apply to the term
"disability" in the ADA .
Those regulations were originally issued by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") in 1977.39 In drafting the
regulations, HEW chose not to create a specific list of illnesses or
diseases constituting disabilities because of "the difficulty of
ensuring the comprehensiveness of any such list."40 Instead, the
agency opted to clarify some specific elements of the statutory
disability definition including "[pihysical or mental impairment" and
"major life activities."4 1 While some comments received during the
rulemaking process expressed concern that this approach was
overbroad and that the agency should have limited the definition to
"traditional" disabilities,4 2  HEW believed that the statutory
language mandated the inclusion of impairments beyond the
"severe, permanent, or progressive conditions that are most
commonly regarded as handicaps.
HEW's definitional regulations expand upon the statutory term
"[p]hysical or mental impairment" by explaining that the category
includes "any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2000); see also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193-94 (2002) ("Congress' repetition of a well-
established term generally implies that Congress intended the term to be
construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.")
(citations omitted).
37. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (May 4, 1977) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(j) (2003)) (defining "handicapped person"). While the Rehabilitation Act
has changed its terminology from "handicapped person" to "individual with a
disability," see supra note 30 and accompanying text, the regulations
accompanying the statute continue to use the older term.
38. S. REP. No. 101-116 (1989).
39. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676. Later, when HEW was split into the Department
of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") in
1979, HHS adopted the section 504 regulations, which currently appear at 45
C.F.R. pt. 84 (2003). For the sake of conciseness, this Article will hereinafter
refer to these regulations as the "HEW regulations."
40. See 42 Fed. Reg. at 22,685 ("Appendix A-Analysis of Final
Regulation").
41. See id. at 22,678 (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2) (2003)).
42. Id. at 22,685 (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, at 350 (2003)).
43. Id. at 22,685-86 (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, at 350 (2003)).
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disfigurement, or anatomical loss" affecting any of a long list of
bodily systems, or "any mental or psychological disorder."" The
regulations define "major life activities" to include "functions such as
caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."45 Thus, under
the first prong of the Rehabilitation Act's disability definition, as
supplemented by the HEW regulations, a person has a disability if
he or she has a disorder or condition that substantially limits an
activity of the type listed. Significantly, HEW chose not to define
the term "substantially limits"; in an explanatory appendix to its
original regulation, the agency noted simply that it did "not believe
that a definition of this term is possible at this time.' 46
The HEW regulations also amplify the second two prongs of the
Rehabilitation Act's disability definition. HEW provisions explain
that a person has a "record" of a disability under the second prong of
the statutory definition if he or she "has a history of, or has been
misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.' 7 With respect
to the third prong, the regulations note that people can be
"regarded" as disabled if their non-limiting impairments are
mistakenly viewed by others as substantially limiting; if their
impairments effectively become substantially limiting because of the
attitudes of other people; or if they have no impairments at all but
are mistakenly treated as if they had substantially limiting
impairments.48
In 1990, thirteen years after HEW issued its section 504
regulations under the Rehabilitation Act, President George H.W.
Bush signed the ADA into law.49  The new statute directed the
EEOC and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to issue regulations to
implement the non-discrimination mandates appearing in Titles I
through III of the ADA.50 The DOJ regulations accompanying Titles
1I and III, which prohibit discrimination in state and local
44. Id. at 22,678 (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (2003)).
45. Id. (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2003)).
46. Id. at 22,685 (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, at 350 (2003)).
47. Id. at 22,678 (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. § 84.3()(2)(iii) (2003)).
48. Id. (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (2003)).
49. See BURGDORF, supra note 30, at 47-48. For a brief history of the events
leading to the ADA's passage, see id. at 43-48.
50. Congress granted the EEOC authority to issue regulations to
implement Title I of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000). Congress granted
the DOJ, through the Attorney General, authority to issue regulations to
implement subtitle A of Title II, see id. § 12134, and to implement the non-
transportation provisions of Title III, see id. § 12186.
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government programs51  and in public accommodations ,
respectively, track the HEW regulatory language almost verbatim
with respect to defining disability.5 3 On the other hand, the EEOC's
definitional regulations accompanying Title I's employment
provisions are more expansive. While the EEOC and HEW
regulations define "physical or mental impairment" and "major life
activities" in almost identical terms,54 the EEOC regulations add an
extremely detailed, if ungrammatical, definition of "substantially
limits," a term that the HEW and DOJ regulations do not define at
all:
The term substantially limits means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular
major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity.55
To supplement the above definition, the EEOC regulations
specify several factors bearing on whether an impairment is
substantially limiting: the impairment's "nature and severity," its
actual or expected "duration," and its actual or expected "permanent
or long term impact." 6 In addition, the regulations explain how a
person can be substantially limited in the specific major life activity
of "working."57  An eighteen-paragraph entry in the EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance to these regulations elaborates even further
upon all of these aspects of the term "substantially limits."
5 8
Because the Rehabilitation Act, its accompanying HEW regulations,
51. See id § 12131(1).
52. See id. § 12181(7).
53. Compare 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2003) (implementing Title I), and 28
C.F.R. § 36.104 (2003) (implementing Title III), with 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)
(2003) (implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
54. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)-(i) (2003) (defining "physical or mental
impairment" and "major life activities," respectively, for purposes of EEOC
regulation), with 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)-(ii) (2003) (defining "physical or mental
impairment" and "major life activities," respectively, for purposes of HEW/HHS
regulation).
55. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2003).
56. Id. § 1630.2(j)(2).
57. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3).
58. See id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j), at 351.
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and the ADA are all silent as to the meaning of "substantially
limits," the EEOC's explanations do not contradict any of these
earlier sources.59 Further, because other agencies charged with
implementing other titles of the ADA have not defined the phrase in• 60
their own regulations, the "substantially limits" regulation
represents a completely independent contribution of the EEOC to
the ADA's disability definition. Thus, the significant gloss
represented by this regulation, which has found its way into so
many federal court opinions,61 is uniquely a product of the EEOC.
III. SITTING OUT THE CHEVRON Two-STEP: THE SUTTON COURT
QUESTIONS, BUT DOES NOT DECIDE, THE VALIDITY OF THE
DISABILITY REGULATIONS
A. The Sutton Pronouncement
In Sutton v. United Air Lines6 2 a 1999 decision, the Supreme
Court first questioned the validity of the EEOC regulations
elaborating upon the ADA's definition of disability.63 The case
concerned an employment discrimination claim made by twin sisters
who were both pilots." The plaintiffs each had severe myopia but
wore lenses to correct the condition.65 After they applied for jobs as
commercial airline pilots with United Air Lines, the company
informed the plaintiffs that because they failed to meet United's
visual acuity requirement, it could not hire them.66 The plaintiffs
brought suit under the ADA, and the district court dismissed the
59. In a preamble to its ADA Title II regulations, the DOJ mentions that a
person is disabled under the first prong of the disability definition if his or her
activities are "restricted as to the conditions, manner, or duration under which
they can be performed in comparison to most people." 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A at
534 (2003). However, the DOJ's Title II regulations do not explicitly define
"substantially limits." See id. § 35.104. Thus, only the EEOC's regulations
contain a specific and detailed definition of this statutory term.
60. DOJ regulations implementing the non-transportation provisions of
Titles II and III of the ADA define "physical or mental impairment" and "major
life activities" but not "substantially limits." See id. §§ 35.104, 36.104.
Department of Transportation regulations implementing the transportation
provisions of those titles are similar in this respect. See 49 C.F.R. § 27.5 (2003).
61. This author's Westlaw search for federal cases specifically citing the
EEOC's "substantially limits" regulation, conducted on October 31, 2003, turned
up 1,287 opinions.
62. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
63. id. at 479.
64. Id. at 475.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 476.
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action, holding that the plaintiffs did not have a disability because
their corrective lenses prevented their myopia from being
substantially limiting.17 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
In arguing to the Supreme Court that their myopia was indeed
a disability, the plaintiffs relied on the EEOC's regulation defining
"substantially limits" and upon that agency's Interpretive Guidance,
which specified that "the determination of whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity be made without regard
to mitigating measures" such as corrective lenses.69  Thus, the
plaintiffs' right to pursue their ADA claims depended directly upon
the validity of the EEOC guidance regarding mitigating measures.
Before turning to the Interpretive Guidance, Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, discussed the EEOC's disability regulations
themselves. In dicta, she noted that while Congress explicitly
granted the EEOC authority to implement Title I of the statute, °
"[n]o agency . . . has been given authority to issue regulations
implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA."7
Among the generally applicable provisions, which precede Title I in
the statutory text, is a "Definitions" section containing the statutory
disability definition.2 This structural framework allowed Justice
O'Connor to conclude more specifically that "no agency has been
delegated authority to interpret the term 'disability. "'73
Nevertheless, because the parties in Sutton accepted the EEOC's
disability regulations as valid, the Court found it unnecessary to
rule upon their validity or to decide "what deference they are due, if
any."74 The Court went on, however, to invalidate the mitigating
measures provision of the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance as "an
impermissible interpretation of the ADA," reasoning that the
statutory phrase "substantially limits" must require "that a person
be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially
limited in order to demonstrate a disability."7' Sutton thus
67. Id.
68. Id. at 477.
69. Id. at 481.
70. Id. at 478 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12116).
71. Id. at 479. The generally applicable provisions of the ADA comprise a
"Findings and purpose" section, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000), and a "Definitions"
section, id. § 12102.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
73. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479.
74. Id. at 480.
75. Id. at 482. The majority buttressed its decision by noting that the ADA
defines disability "with respect to an individual," and the required
individualized inquiry should take into account any measures that a specific
individual uses to mitigate the effects of an impairment, rather than relying
upon generalized notions of how a given impairment tends to affect human
20041
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invalidated both the plaintiffs' ADA claims and the EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance on mitigating measures. In addition, while
the majority opinion left the EEOC's disability regulations intact, it
cast doubt upon the notion that courts should defer to them.
In a well-reasoned dissent, Justice Breyer took issue with the
majority's assertion that Congress had not granted any agency-
including the EEOC-authority to interpret the statutory definition
of "disability."76 He noted that the term "disability" appears not only
in the general Definitions section of the ADA, but also in Title I,
which prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability."77 Thus, he reasoned, EEOC
regulations elaborating upon the word "disability" for purposes of
Title I would fall within the EEOC's delegated authority. 78 Justice
Breyer went on to note that "[t]he physical location of the
activities. Id. at 483. The Court also noted that the ADA includes an explicit
Congressional finding that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities," and that this figure would appear to exclude
people who use measures such as corrective lenses to alleviate the effects of
their impairments. Id. at 484-87 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994)).
Numerous scholars have since criticized the majority's reasoning. See, e.g.,
Eichhorn, Mitigating Measures, supra note 26, at 1108 (stating that the
majority imposed "a 'plain meaning' analysis upon statutory language that is
far from plain"); Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a
Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans
with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 326 (2001) (noting that the
majority's "exercise in sentence diagramming" did little to unveil actual
congressional intent); Mark A. Rothstein et al., Using Established Medical
Criteria to Define Disability: A Proposal to Amend the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 244 (2002) (stating that Sutton and its
two companion cases exemplify the "inconsistent and implausible results" the
Court has reached when interpreting the scope of the ADA); Aviam Soifer, The
Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1279, 1302 (2000) (characterizing the majority's opinion as "a curious mixture of
extreme procedural formalism and sweeping substantive legerdemain"); Tucker,
supra note 26, at 350 (arguing that the "Court erred in refusing to look to the
legislative history of the ADA for aid" in interpreting statutory ambiguity);
Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MIcH. L.
REV. 532, 565 (2000) (noting that "[n] one of the statutory provisions relied upon
by the Court in finding congressional intent was dispositive of the question
presented").
76. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 514-15. At least two scholars have argued that
Justice Breyer's view represents the more reasonable interpretation of the
ADA's delegation provisions. See Barbara Hoffman, Reports of Its Death Were
Greatly Exaggerated: The EEOC Regulations that Define "Disability" Under the
ADA After Sutton v. United Air Lines, 9 TEMPLE POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 253,
268 (2000); White, supra note 75, at 579-80.




definitional section [within the ADA] seems to reflect only drafting
or stylistic, not substantive, objectives," and that "to pick and choose
among which of [Title I's] words the EEOC has the power to explain
would inhibit the development of law that coherently interprets this
important statute."79
The same day it decided Sutton, the Court also issued decisions
in two companion cases, both of which also raised the issue of
whether mitigating measures should factor into the disability
analysis under the ADA. The plaintiff in Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.80 had high blood pressure, which he controlled through
medication.81 The plaintiff in Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg82 had
extremely poor vision in one eye but had developed "subconscious
mechanisms for coping" with this impairment. 3 As it had in Sutton,
the Court in these cases held that the effects of the mitigating
measures used by the plaintiffs were relevant to the analysis of
whether their impairments substantially limited any major life
activities and thus qualified as disabilities. 4 In so holding, the
Albertson's majority invalidated the EEOC Interpretive Guidance
concerning mitigating measures but specifically declined to rule on
what level of deference, if any, to accord the rest of the Interpretive
Guidance and to the agency's disability regulations.85
B. Administrative Law Background
In Sutton and its two companion cases, the Court left open the
possibility that the EEOC's disability regulations might be valid,
even if the EEOC lacked "authority to interpret the term
'disability.' 86 An analysis of the regulations' validity, and of the
level of deference due them if they are in fact valid, requires
preliminarily an explanation of some principles of administrative
law. First, agency regulations may be either legislative or
interpretive, depending on their capacity to bind courts and the
public and on the process leading to their issuance.8' Legislative
regulations are intended to have the force of law, and agencies must
enact them in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act
79. Id. at 515.
80. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
81. Id. at 519.
82. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
83. Id. at 559, 565.
84. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521; Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66.
85. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 523 (assuming, arguendo, the validity of the
EEOC disability regulations); Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 563 n.10 (same).
86. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999).
87. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 324-26 (4th
ed., 2002) (distinguishing legislative and interpretive rules).
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("APA"). s8 Interpretive regulations are merely explanatory, are not
meant to bind the public, and need not issue through the APA
rulemaking process.89 While a federal agency cannot issue valid
legislative regulations without express or implied authorization
from Congress, the agency is always free to issue interpretive
regulations of any statute it is charged with administering.90
Next, in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council Inc.,9' the Supreme Court clarified the level of deference
that courts must accord to legislative regulations. Under Chevron, a
court must defer to a legislative regulation, provided that the agency
had express or implied authority to issue it, and provided that the
regulation clarifies a true statutory ambiguity with a permissible
interpretation of the statutory language.92  This principle of
deference stems from the fact that Congress, as an elected and
accountable branch of government, has the power to delegate its
legislative authority to federal agencies, which are in turn indirectly
accountable through the Chief Executive. Once Congress has
delegated legislative authority to an agency, a federal court "may
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of [the]
agency."93  Courts "are not part of either political branch of the
88. Id. at 324-25. Under the APA, agencies may issue binding legislative
rules through either a formal or an informal process. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556
(2000) (describing formal rulemaking), with 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (describing
informal rulemaking). Informal rulemaking, also known as "notice and
comment" rulemaking, is the much more common process. PIERCE, supra note
87, at 411-12. Notice and comment rulemaking requires an agency to allow
interested parties an opportunity to comment in writing upon draft rules, which
are published in the Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). Formal
rulemaking, on the other hand, requires an agency to conduct an oral
evidentiary hearing regarding a proposed rule. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (2000).
89. PIERCE, supra note 87, at 324-34 (distinguishing legislative and
interpretive rules); 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2000) (exempting interpretive rules
from notice and comment requirements); see also Rebecca Hanner White, The
EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the
Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 51, 79
(describing an interpretive rule as "the agency's pronouncement of what it
thinks a statute means").
90. PIERCE, supra note 87, at 325; see also Robert A. Anthony, Which
Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5
(1990) ("Under our system of limited government, an agency cannot announce
actions that bind citizens and the courts unless Congress has delegated to it the
authority to do so.").
91. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For a concise explanation of Chevron and its
conceptual foundations, see PIERCE, supra note 87, at 137-47.
92. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
93. Id. at 844.
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Government"9 4 and "have no constituency."95 Thus, they may not
usurp the power to make policy choices from Congress, or, in turn,
from an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making
authority with respect to a given statute.96
The process that Chevron instructs courts to follow when
confronting agency regulations has become known as the Chevron
two-step.97 In step one, after determining that Congress has granted
an agency rulemaking authority with respect to a given statute, a
court must consider whether the applicable statutory provision is in
fact ambiguous or silent with respect to the issue before the court. If
the provision speaks unambiguously to the issue, then the court
must apply the statute in light of Congress' express intent.
However, if the provision is ambiguous or silent, then the court
must proceed to step two by determining whether the agency's
amplifying regulation "is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."98  In general terms, an agency's construction will be
deemed permissible if it is "reasonable,"99 as opposed to "arbitrary"
or "capricious."'' ° If the court holds in step two that the regulatory
construction is reasonable, then it must give "controlling weight" to
that construction.101
This two-step analysis applies only to legislative regulations;
Chevron deference does not extend to mere interpretive regulations,
which are not normally issued through the APA's notice and
comment process and lack the force of law. 1 2  Instead, such
regulations receive a lower level of deference described by the
94. Id. at 865.
95. Id. at 866.
96. See Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE
J. ON REG., 283, 309 (1986) (explaining that "[wihen Congress has not spoken to
an issue, Chevron forbids the courts to engage in supervisory oversight of the
agencies").
97. See John F. Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39,
42 (2003) (attributing the coinage to Kenneth Starr).
98. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
99. Id. at 845.
100. Id. at 844.
101. Id.
102. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S.
144, 157 (1991) (holding that interpretive rules and enforcement guidelines are
"not entitled to the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of the
Secretary's delegated lawmaking powers"); see also Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) ("Interpretations such as those in opinion
letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals,
and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant
Chevron-style deference.").
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Supreme Court in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.:
10 3
The weight of such [an agency interpretation] in a particular
case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control. 0
4
Thus, Skidmore deference is a far cry from Chevron deference;
under Skidmore, a court simply takes an agency's interpretation for
whatever the court thinks it may be worth, given the above factors.
C. The Post-Sutton Status of the EEOC's Disability Regulations
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the EEOC's
disability regulations are valid and whether they are entitled to
Chevron deference." 5 The Sutton majority expressly avoided the
questions because the parties had agreed to the regulations' validity
and because, in the end, the question before the Court turned on the
validity of the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance rather than on the
disability regulations themselves. °6
Nevertheless, the majority opinion cast an unfortunate and
inappropriate doubt upon the regulations' validity by pronouncing
that "no agency has been delegated authority to interpret the term
'disability' under the ADA.107 The pronouncement is inappropriate
103. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
104. Id. at 140; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235-38
(2001) (discussing the continuing role of Skidmore deference after Chevron);
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 ("[I]nterpretations contained in formats such as
opinion letters are entitled to respect under our decision in Skidmore.")
(quotation and citation omitted); Martin, 499 U.S. at 157 (noting that
interpretive rules are entitled to "some weight on judicial review") (citing
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140); Anthony, supra note 90, at 55-58 (explaining the
level of deference due to interpretive rules).
105. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002)
("Because both parties accept the EEOC regulations as reasonable, we assume
without deciding that they are, and we have no occasion to decide what level of
deference, if any, they are due."); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
480 (1999) ("Because both parties accept [the EEOC disability] regulations as
valid, and determining their validity is not necessary to decide this case, we
have no occasion to consider what deference they are due, if any."). Rebecca
Hanner White has proposed that although the Sutton opinion is "not clear" as to
whether the Court applied Chevron to the EEOC disability regulations, the
"most defensible reading of the Sutton opinion" suggests that the Court resolved
the question presented at Chevron's step one, holding that the statutory
language provided an unambiguous answer. See White, supra note 75, at 564-
65.
106. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480.
107. Id. at 479. This doubt has not gone unnoticed by lower courts. See, e.g.,
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for several reasons. First, it flies in the face of the Court's earlier
position, articulated in Bragdon v. Abbott,'08 that agency
interpretations of the ADA's disability definition should receive the
highest deference. Bragdon focused specifically on DOJ regulations
implementing Title III of the ADA. Like the EEOC, the DOJ had
issued regulations elaborating upon the statutory disability
definition,"'9 even though the Department's legislative charge was
limited to a specific title of the statute." The Bragdon Court turned
to these regulations, among other authorities, in its analysis of
whether the plaintiffs asymptomatic HIV was a disability. Citing
Chevron, the Court explained that because Congress directed the
DOJ to issue regulations implementing Title III, the DOJ's "views
are entitled to deference.""' In the very next sentence, the Court
noted that "[tihe Justice Department's interpretation of the
definition of disability is consistent with our analysis.""2 Thus, the
"views" that the Court thought deserving of Chevron deference must
have included the DOJ regulations interpreting the disability
definition. Because the DOJ's charge to implement Title III is no
broader than the EEOC's charge to implement Title 1,1 the same
Chevron deference should apply to the EEOC's disability
regulations, under the Bragdon Court's reasoning."' Thus, when
the Sutton majority questioned the validity of the EEOC's disability
regulations only one year after Bragdon, it created a glaring
inconsistency regarding its treatment of similarly-authorized
administrative provisions under the ADA.
In addition, the Sutton majority's pronouncement ignores the
nature of the power Congress delegated to the EEOC. Under Title I
of the ADA, the agency has the specific power to set policy through
legislative regulations."5 Given the threshold requirement that an
ADA plaintiff prove a disability, and given the statute's ambiguous
definition of that term, the EEOC could not possibly carry out its
EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 654 n.5 (5th Cir. 1999) (observing
that Sutton "casts a shadow of doubt over the validity and authority of the
EEOC's regulations").
108. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
109. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2003).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2000) (authorizing the DOJ, through the
Attorney General, to issue regulations to implement the non-transportation
provisions of Title III of the ADA).
111. 524 U.S. at 646 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844.
112. Id.
113. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000), with § 12186.
114. See Colker, supra note 3, at 152 (stating that Bragdon "provides a
strong foundation for judicial deference to EEOC regulations").
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
2004]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
assigned powers under Title I without developing substantive
policies regarding the precise scope of the statutory disability
definition. Thus, it is natural to assume that if Congress chose the
EEOC as the appropriate agency to make binding policy choices
with respect to Title I, it must also have entrusted the EEOC with
authority to articulate exactly what "disability" means for purposes
of that Title."' In addition, because Congress passed the ADA six
years after Chevron clarified the high level of deference that
administrative regulations are due, it follows that Congress did not
make any of these choices lightly. The Sutton majority ignored
these circumstances, however, when it questioned the EEOC's
power to elaborate upon the disability definition. In so doing, the
majority perpetuated a view of the EEOC as a second-class agency
that lacks real power."7 While the EEOC indeed has only minimal
rulemaking power under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18
its substantive authority under the ADA far exceeds its limited
powers under that older statute. Despite this fact, several scholars
have speculated that courts may reflexively strike down EEOC
guidance under the ADA because those courts have grown
accustomed, under Title VII, to viewing the EEOC as a weak
119
agency.
116. As the Supreme Court explained recently,
Congress... may not have expressly delegated authority or
responsibility to implement a particular provision or fill a particular
gap. Yet it can still be apparent from the agency's generally conferred
authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it
addresses ambiguity in the statute ....
United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2093 (1990) ("[I]t is
plausible to think that the legislative grant of rulemaking power implicitly
carries with it the grant of authority to interpret ambiguities in the law that the
agency is entrusted with administering."); White, supra note 89, at 83 (noting
that "an agency to whom Congress delegated broad lawmaking powers is the
likely candidate for resolving the policy choices implicated in statutory
interpretation").
117. For discussions of the disrespect historically accorded to the EEOC, see
Colker, supra note 3, at 135-44; White, supra note 89, at 56-57; Theodore W.
Wern, Note, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act,
the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
1533, 1578-80 (1999). A recent empirical study has determined that the EEOC
receives a "considerably low level of deference" as compared to other
administrative agencies. Wern, supra, at 1549-50.
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2000) (authorizing the EEOC to
promulgate only "procedural regulations"); see also White, supra note 86, at 56
(discussing the EEOC's limited powers under Title VII).
119. See Colker, supra note 3, at 139, 144; Wern, supra note 117, at 1578; see
also White, supra note 75, at 570-72 (discussing the Supreme Court's
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Despite these problems, the Sutton majority's pronouncement
that the EEOC lacks authority to interpret the ADA's disability
definition-even if dictum-is a reality that cannot be ignored. The
pronouncement, which explicitly suggests that the EEOC disability
regulations may nevertheless be valid, can be interpreted in either
of two ways. First, the Sutton majority may have meant that while
the EEOC lacks express administrative authority from Congress
with respect to the disability definition, the agency did receive
implied authority, and the EEOC thus engaged in valid legislative
rulemaking when it issued the disability regulations. Alternatively,
the majority may have meant that Congress granted the EEOC
neither express nor implied authority to issue legislative rules
regarding the disability definition, but the agency's disability
provisions are nevertheless valid as interpretive regulations.
The first interpretation is unlikely. When Justice O'Connor
declared in Sutton that "no agency has been delegated authority to
interpret the term 'disability," 120 she presumably meant that no
agency had expressly or impliedly been delegated such authority. 
21
Had she meant to leave open the possibility of implied delegation,
she would likely have inserted the word "expressly" into her
sentence. Further, the Sutton majority flatly rejected Justice
Breyer's position, which asserts that Congress granted the EEOC
authority to elaborate upon the disability definition for purposes of
Title I by repeating the word "disability" in the text of Title I. If
Justice Breyer's reasoning suggested an implied grant of authority,
then the majority dismissed this suggestion as an "imaginative
interpretation of the Act's delegation provisions."122
Nevertheless, the possibility remains that Breyer was
mustering evidence of an express grant of authority, in which case
the majority did not necessarily dismiss the possibility of implied
authority when it rejected his position. If an implied grant exists,
then the disability regulations are valid legislative rules to which
Chevron deference should apply. Like the EEOC's other legislative
regulations implementing Title I of the ADA, the disability
regulations issued from the notice and comment rulemaking process
and were thus properly promulgated in accordance with the APA.
123
"unwillingness to give meaningful deference to the EEOC under Title VII").
120. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999).
121. But see White, supra note 75, at 578 & n.278 (interpreting Justice
O'Connor's sentence as referring only to express delegation).
122. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479.
123. The EEOC issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in 1990 in
which it sought comment on various topics, including the definition of disability.
See 55 Fed. Reg. 31,192 (Aug. 1, 1990). This advance notice was followed by the
publication of a second notice, which included both the proposed Title I
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Therefore, the Chevron two-step would dictate that the disability
regulations deserve controlling weight in judicial decisions, provided
that the statutory definition of "disability" is ambiguous and that
the EEOC's elaboration upon that definition is reasonable.124 In
applying Chevron's step one, a court could hardly conclude that the
ADA's "disability" definition is unambiguous; numerous federal
courts have reached different conclusions regarding the definition's
scope,12' and the Supreme Court justices themselves have disagreed
as to the application of the definition's "major life activity"
element. 126
In addition, in applying Chevron's step two, a court would have
to find that the EEOC's disability regulations represent a
reasonable construction of the statutory definition. Most of the
disability regulations simply mirror those that the HEW issued
under the Rehabilitation Act, 127 and Congress has explicitly
instructed courts to construe the ADA's provisions consistently with• 128
that earlier statute and its accompanying regulations. Only the
EEOC's "substantially limits" regulation expands upon those
predecessors, and it, too, is a reasonable construction of the ADA.
That regulation characterizes a "substantially limit[ing]"
impairment as one that either renders a person "[u]nable to
perform" major life activities that most people can perform, or leaves
the person "significantly restricted" in performing such activities
with respect to "condition, manner, or duration."'29  The first
notion-that of inability to perform-was certainly contemplated by
Congress when it chose to define disability in terms of substantial
limitation. The ADA was surely meant to cover, for example, blind
people (who have an inability to see), and people with paraplegia
(who have an inability to walk).2 0 In addition, the second notion-
regulations and the proposed Interpretive Guidance. 56 Fed. Reg. 8578 (Feb.
28, 1991). On July 26, 1991, the EEOC published its final regulations and
Interpretive Guidance. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726.
124. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
125. See Crossley, supra note 35, at 626 (noting, in 1999, that "the torrent of
decisions on defining disability are all over the board").
126. In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Court faced the question of whether
reproduction was a "major life activity" for purposes of the ADA's disability
definition. 524 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1998). A five-justice majority concluded that
it was. See id. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, however, reached the
opposite conclusion, see id. at 659, as did Justice O'Connor, see id. at 664-65.
127. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2000).
129. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2003); see supra note 55 and accompanying
text.
130. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 451 ("For example, a paraplegic is substantially limited in the
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that of significant restriction with respect to condition, manner, or
duration of performance-has direct roots in the ADA's legislative
history; the Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources referred to substantially limited activities as being
"restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which
they can be performed" by the disabled individual.13 ' Therefore, both
parts of the EEOC regulation defining "substantially limits" pass
Chevron's step two because they are reasonable reflections of
congressional intent. Thus, if a court accepts the first interpretation
of the Sutton majority's pronouncement and takes the disability
regulations as legislative rules, that court would have to give
controlling weight to the regulations under Chevron.
Overall, however, the second interpretation of the Sutton
majority's pronouncement is more likely: The EEOC lacked any
authority to issue substantive regulations regarding the disability
definition, but the agency's disability provisions are potentially valid
interpretive regulations. Agencies always retain the ability to issue
interpretive regulations, even in the absence of congressional
directives.13' Thus, if a lack of authority precludes the EEOC
disability provisions from qualifying as legislative regulations, then
they are presumably interpretive regulations that deserve at least
some deference. Such regulations, while not meriting Chevron
deference, 1n still "constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance," in accordance with Skidmore.3 4  A court applying
Skidmore deference will assess the regulations' persuasive weight in
terms of the level of consideration the issuing agency gave to them,
and the validity of their underlying reasoning, and their consistency
with other agency pronouncements, among other factors.' In the
case of the EEOC disability regulations, these factors indicate a high
degree of persuasive force. First, unlike most interpretive
regulations, the EEOC disability regulations were issued through
the notice and comment rulemaking process and thus received a
great deal of agency consideration. In addition, the reasoning
underlying the regulations-apart from the "substantially limits"
major life activity of walking, [and] a person who is blind is substantially
limited in the major life activity of seeing .....
131. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 622 (1989).
132. See PIERCE, supra note 87, at 325 ("[Aln agency has the power to issue
binding legislative rules only if... Congress has authorized it to do so. By
contrast, any agency has the inherent power to issue interpretative rules."
(citations omitted)).
133. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
134. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
135. See id.
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regulation-is unquestionably valid because it echoes the reasoning
of the HEW regulations under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
which Congress specifically incorporated into the ADA. The
reasoning underlying the "substantially limits" regulation is also
valid, for the reasons cited in the Chevron step two analysis above.
Lastly, the disability regulations represent the EEOC's only
interpretation of the term "disability" for purposes of the ADA and
therefore do not contradict any other agency pronouncements.
In the end, despite the doubts cast by the Sutton majority's
dictum, the EEOC's disability regulations deserve deference, either
because they pass muster under the Chevron two-step or because
they are extremely persuasive under Skidmore. Indeed, in the
months and years following the Sutton decision, the lower federal
courts continued to accept the EEOC's disability regulations as valid
and persuasive.136 It was against this backdrop that the Supreme
Court next spoke about the regulations in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.
3 7
IV. THE TOYOTA SIDESTEP
In Toyota, the Court addressed the proper standard for
determining whether a person is substantially limited in the major
life activity of performing manual tasks and thus disabled for ADA
purposes. The Court decided this issue only in terms of actual
disability under the first prong of the statutory disability
definition; 38 the appeal did not address the "record of' or "regarded
as" prongs. The plaintiff, Ella Williams, was an assembly line
worker at a Toyota plant. Over time, her work with pneumatic tools
caused her to develop tendinitis and carpal tunnel syndrome.'
39
After extended negotiations with her employer, she was reassigned
to a quality control team where her primary duties involved visual
inspections and she had to perform only limited manual tasks.
140
After a few years, however, Toyota added a new duty to her
workload that involved using a sponge to apply oil to cars coming
136. See, e.g., Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 312 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating
that the "EEOC's [disability] regulations are entitled to 'great deference"')
(citing Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., 140 F.3d 144, 150 n.3 (2d Cir.
1998)); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 955 (8th Cir.
1999) (relying on the EEOC's "substantially limits" regulation); Tatum v. Hosp.
of the Univ. of Penn., No. CIV.A. 98-6198, 1999 WL 482320, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
1999) (according "substantial deference" to the disability regulations); see also
Hoffman, supra note 76, at 278-80 (reviewing post-Sutton cases through 2000).
137. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
138. Id. at 192-93.
139. Id. at 187.
140. Id. at 188-89.
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down the assembly line so as to highlight any imperfections in their
paint jobs. In applying the oil, Ms. Williams would have to "hold her
hands and arms up around shoulder height for several hours at a
time. ' 141 Shortly after assuming this new duty, she suffered pain in
her neck and shoulders and was diagnosed with myotendinitis and
"thoracic outlet compression, a condition that causes pain in the
nerves that lead to the upper extremities.",4 At that point, she
asked Toyota to accommodate her by eliminating the oil-application
task from her job duties. The record before the Court was unclear as
to whether Toyota actually denied this request, or whether Ms.
Williams simply began missing work at that point.4 3 At any rate,
Ms. Williams's physician eventually recommended that she not work
at all because of her physical problems, and Toyota terminated her
employment approximately seven weeks afterward.
144
Ms. Williams filed suit under the ADA, claiming that the
termination and Toyota's failure to accommodate her condition
violated Title I's anti-discrimination provision. 4 1 Although Title I
indeed requires employers to accommodate an employee's
disabilities under certain circumstances, 46 the District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky did not reach that issue. Instead, it
granted Toyota summary judgment on the theory that Ms. Williams
was not disabled and thus not entitled to the statute's protections.
147
The district court held that Ms. Williams's evidence indicated that
her physical problems limited her in working, lifting, and
performing manual tasks, all of which the court accepted as "major
life activities" for purposes of the ADA's disability definition. 46
However, the court also held that her evidence fell short of showing
a "substantial" limitation in any of these activities as a matter of
law. 149 The Sixth Circuit reversed that ruling, holding that Ms.
Williams's evidence could support a finding that she was
substantially limited in a major life activity. The court based this
holding on evidence showing that Ms. Williams was unable to
perform a "broad range or class of manual activities" requiring the
141. Id. at 189.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 189-90.
145. Id. at 190.
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (stating that a failure to make
reasonable accommodations to an employee's disability amounts to prohibited
discrimination, unless the accommodation would cause the employer "undue
hardship").
147. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 190-91.
148. Id. at 191.
149. Id.
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gripping of tools and the elevation of one's arms for long periods."'°
The Supreme Court disagreed with this analysis of the
"substantially limits" element of the statutory disability definition.
After noting that the HEW disability regulations accompanying the
Rehabilitation Act fail to define "substantially limits," a unanimous
Court turned to the EEOC's disability regulations. In doing so, it
repeated the Sutton Court's pronouncement that "no agency has
been given authority to issue regulations interpreting the term
'disability' in the ADA., 51 However, because the parties in Toyota
had agreed that the EEOC's disability regulations were
"reasonable," the Court assumed they were valid and once again
declined to decide "what level of deference, if any," they were due.' 5
In focusing on whether Ms. Williams's condition imposed a
substantial limitation on her ability to perform manual tasks, the
Court recited the EEOC's definition of "substantially limit[ed],"
which speaks in terms of a person being either 'Junable to perform"
a major life activity or "[s]ignificantly restricted" in performing the
activity with respect to "condition, manner, or duration." 3  The
Court also noted that the EEOC regulations instruct courts to
consider the impairment's "nature and severity," its "expected
duration," and its "permanent or long-term impact.'5 4
Most significantly, however, when the Court turned to the
assessment of whether Ms. Williams was substantially limited in
manual tasks, it claimed that the EEOC regulations were "silent" as
to the meaning of "substantial limitation" in that specific context."'
This claim, of course, conveniently sidestepped the fact that the
regulatory definition of "substantially limits," which the Court had
just recited, is meant to apply to all major life activities. Thus, the
Court's finding of regulatory silence in Toyota is a bit like a
declaration that a dictionary is silent regarding the meaning of "sit"
in the context of chairs, because it contains only a generic definition
of the verb that could also apply to benches, stools, or ottomans.
Nonetheless, having taken the EEOC regulations as silent on
the issue of substantial limitations for purposes of the question
before it, the Toyota Court resorted to an increasingly popular
source of judicial guidance: dictionaries. 56 Using a plain meaning
150. 224 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 2000).
151. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 194.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 195 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2001)) (alterations in original).
154. Id. at 196 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii)).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and
Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 71, 71-72 (1994)
(noting that since 1989, "more and more disputes about the meaning of statutes
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approach, the Court noted that dictionaries equated "substantial"
with "considerable" or "to a large degree."1 57 It therefore went on to
interpret "substantial limitation" in terms of utter prevention or
severe restriction. Because the Court also held that to qualify as
major life activities, the "manual tasks in question must be central
to daily life," it concluded overall that "to be substantially limited in
performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment
that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing
activities that are of central importance to most people's daily
lives .,159
To buttress its holding, the Court noted that both the
substantially limits element and the major life activity element of
the ADA's disability definition require strict interpretation "to
create a demanding standard" for statutory coverage. 160 This
conclusion rested on an explicit congressional finding in the ADA
that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or
mental disabilities."161  The Court reasoned that a broader
interpretation of the ADA's disability definition would yield a much
higher number of disabled people who could potentially seek
statutory protection.162  The Sutton Court had also cited the 43
million figure to reinforce its holding that people who use mitigating
measures to alleviate the effects of their impairments should not
come within the statute's protective sweep. 163 Unfortunately, upon
close examination, the figure is a questionable source of guidance
because it is based upon agency reports that define disability
differently than do the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.'" Indeed,
in his dissent in Sutton, Justice Stevens noted an "inability to make
the 43 million figure fit any consistent method of interpreting the
word 'disabled." 6 '
In the end, the Toyota majority held that Ms. Williams would
have to show that her impairments affected more than her
performance of occupation-specific tasks in order to prove a
disability.1 66  The Court's procedural disposition of the case is
are greeted with citations to dictionaries").
157. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 196-97 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2280 (1976); 17 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 66-67 (2d ed. 1989)).
158. See id. at 198.
159. Id. at 197-98.
160. Id. at 197.
161. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)).
162. Id.
163. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, at 484-87 (1999).
164. See Eichhorn, Mitigating Measures, supra note 26, at 1113.
165. 527 U.S. at 512.
166. See 534 U.S. at 200-201.
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somewhat confused, however. While the Sixth Circuit had spoken in
terms of Ms. Williams having mustered sufficient evidence to
survive summary judgment on the issue of disability,167 the Supreme
Court interpreted the Sixth Circuit's opinion as granting summary
judgment in her favor on this issue.' As a result, the Supreme
Court assessed the record in terms of whether Ms. Williams had
demonstrated an actual disability as a matter of law, and not
whether she had failed to do so as a matter of law. Thus, because
the record indicated that Ms. Williams "could still brush her teeth,
wash her face, bathe," and perform some other routine tasks, the
Court held that the evidence failed to show "such severe restrictions
in the activities that are of central importance to most people's daily
lives that they establish a manual task disability as a matter of
law.' 69
On its face, the unanimous Toyota opinion, like the Sutton
majority opinion, leaves open the continuing question of the
deference due the EEOC disability regulations. On a more insidious
level, however, the Toyota opinion accords no deference at all to the
"substantially limits" regulation. By taking the regulation as silent
on the issue before it, the Court simply acted as if the regulation
never existed. In doing so, the Court gave itself license to ignore
applicable regulatory language and to substitute its own language to
reflect the so-called plain meaning of statutory terms. For example,
the Court recited EEOC language calling for analysis of "condition,
manner, or duration" of the performance of a major life activity,
1 7 0
but it never analyzed these aspects of Ms. Williams's performance of
various manual tasks. Similarly, the Court recited EEOC language
indicating that an impairment's "permanent or long-term impact" is
one of several factors relevant to substantial limitation, 17' but its
opinion then morphed this factor into an absolute requirement,
stating flatly that the "impairment's impact must ... be permanent
or long term.", 72 Finally, the Court recited EEOC language equating
substantial limitation with "[slignificant[]" restriction, 7 3 but the
Justices-after winding their way through dictionary definitions of
"substantial" that do not contain the word "severe"'74 -somehow
167. See id. at 200-03.
168. Id. at 202.
169. Id. The Court refrained from deciding whether to reinstate the district
court's grant of summary judgment to Toyota on the issue of disability because
Toyota had failed to seek summary judgment in its petition for certiorari. Id.
170. Id. at 196.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 198.
173. Id. at 195 (first brackets in original).
174. See id. at 196-97.
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ratcheted this element upward to a "severe" restriction.
175
Conveniently, the Court never cited HEW guidance stating that an
impairment need not be "severe, permanent, or progressive" to be
substantially limiting for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act's
disability definition. 176 The express language of the ADA instructs
courts to interpret that statute as broadly as HEW had interpreted
the Rehabilitation Act,177 but the plain meaning of this bit of ADA
text apparently did not interest the Toyota Court.
Thus, without invoking Chevron or Skidmore-either of which
would have indicated that the EEOC "substantially limits"
regulation merits great deference, as explained in Part III.C.
above-the Court in Toyota implicitly decided to show no deference
at all to a reasonable regulatory definition that had passed through
the entire notice-and-comment process. Indeed, the Court replaced
the Chevron two-step with a move that one could label "the Toyota
sidestep."
V. WATCHING THE SIDESTEP CATCH ON: LOWER COURT
APPLICATIONS OF TOYOTA
Actions speak louder than words. While the Toyota court
explicitly refused to decide the level of deference due the EEOC's
disability regulations, its complete disregard of the agency's
"substantially limits" regulation has not gone unnoticed by the lower
federal courts in the last year. Indeed, several federal circuits,
relying on the Toyota Court's apparent replacement of the EEOC's
"condition, manner, or duration" standard with the Court's own
dictionary-derived "severe restriction" standard, immediately
viewed Toyota as creating a new "substantially limits" analysis. The
Seventh Circuit, for example, was quick to observe that Toyota had
effectively enunciated a new definition of "substantially limits" and
thereby "established a higher threshold for the statute than some
had believed it contained."7 8 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit explained
in a 2003 decision that it would henceforth apply the more
demanding Supreme Court standard to its "substantially limits"
analysis, rather than "the less-restrictive EEOC definition."1 79 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
175. Id. at 202.
176. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676, 22,685-86 (May 4, 1977) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84
app. A, at 350 (2003)).
177. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
178. Dvorak v. Mostardi Platt Assocs., Inc., 289 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir.
2002).
179. Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 715 (8th Cir.
2003).
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has also noted this recent change, declaring that "[o]n January 8,
2002, ... the Supreme Court significantly altered the definition of
'substantially limits a major life activity.""' The court went on to
add that Toyota's interpretation of this language "creates additional
obstacles" for plaintiffs alleging workplace discrimination.'
In several circuits, a retreat from the EEOC's "condition,
manner or duration" standard, in favor of Toyota's "severe
restriction" standard, is making it noticeably harder for plaintiffs to
seek coverage under the ADA in employment discrimination cases.
For example, in EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,82 the Ninth
Circuit reversed a district court's holding that two of three job
applicants were disabled under the first prong of the ADA's
disability definition because they had actual impairments that
substantially limited their ability to see. Both applicants had no
vision in the right eye, and both therefore failed to pass the vision
protocol that United Parcel Service ["UPS"] administered to
candidates for driving jobs."'3 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of California held that the two applicants'
vision impairments constituted actual disabilities under the first
prong of the disability definition.18 4 The court also held that all
three applicants satisfied the second ("regarded as") prong because
UPS had regarded all people who failed the protocol as substantially
limited in seeing, even though some of them could see well enough
to drive safely.
1 85
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit revisited the issue of whether the
first two applicants had an actual disability under the first prong of
the statutory definition. Applying Toyota, the court held that for
monocularity to qualify as a disability, it "must prevent or severely
restrict use of [an individual's] eyesight compared with how
unimpaired individuals normally use their eyesight in daily life."
18 6
One of the two applicants, James Francis, had produced evidence
that he lacked stereopsis, the ability to combine two retinal images
into one, and therefore had difficulty judging depth perception
within a few feet. Although he could engage in many daily activities
without difficulty, the lack of stereopsis forced him to rely on his
sense of touch and on other cues when performing tasks such as
putting a screwdriver on a screw, putting a pot on a stove burner, or
180. Stedman v. Bizmart, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1220 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
181. Id. at 1221.
182. 306 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2002).
183. Id. at 799.
184. 149 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part and reversed
in part, 306 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2002).
185. Id. at 1157-58.
186. 306 F.3d at 802.
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hammering a nail.'17  The other applicant, Stephen Ligas, had
similar problems with depth perception and had trained himself to
"focus[] in" when tying shoes, climbing stairs, and putting keys in
locks. In the district court, the fact that Ligas and Francis
perceived near-field objects in a different manner than people
without visual impairments weighed in favor of a finding of
disability under the EEOC's "substantially limits" standard, even
though both men could perform many day-to-day tasks without
difficulty. Indeed, the district court emphasized that "a touch-and-
feel substitute for stereopsis does not improve vision itself any more
than braille would cure blindness. Accordingly, the fact that
claimants lead normal lives proves little." 89 While the district court
never cited the EEOC's "condition, manner, or duration" test in
holding that Ligas and Francis were substantially limited in seeing,
the court's emphasis on the unusual methods the men had
developed to perceive near-field objects coincided with the EEOC's
prescribed analysis.
Applying Toyota, however, the Ninth Circuit held that neither
Francis nor Ligas had an actual disability under the ADA definition.
The appellate court reasoned that because both men could still
perform tasks not requiring near-field perception and because they
used various compensating strategies when performing near-field
work, they used their "eyesight as most people do for daily life" and
were thus not substantially limited in seeing.' 90  As for the
definition's "regarded as" prong, the Ninth Circuit remanded the
case to the district court, declaring that the district court's findings
on that issue had been unclear because that court had performed its
analysis "without benefit of Toyota."'' The appellate court stated
that under Toyota, the proper inquiry on remand would concern
whether UPS incorrectly regarded the applicants' impairments as
"substantially and significantly limit[ing] their overall seeing for
purposes of daily life." 192 The court also noted that the company's
belief that the applicants could not drive its trucks safely, standing
alone, would not satisfy this standard, and that the accuracy of that
belief was not relevant. Therefore, on remand, the district court's
original emphasis of UPS's unsupported assumptions regarding the
driving abilities of people with monocular vision would be largely
irrelevant, even though the district court had noted that such
187. Id. at 799.
188. Id.
189. 149 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
190. 306 F.3d at 803.
191. Id. at 806.
192. Id.
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assumptions "constitute[] the type of stereotypical prejudice the
ADA sought to end."193
Because the district court in UPS had also held that Ligas and
Francis were not qualified for the driving jobs for which they had
applied, 94 the issue of their status as individuals with disabilities
may seem at first blush to have little consequence. However,
because it directly governs coverage under the ADA, the disability
issue is always critical; if a plaintiff is held not to be disabled, the
defendant will not have to defend its policies, which may well have
discriminatory effects. The district court in UPS, for example,
carefully analyzed the possible discriminatory effects of the
company's vision protocol after finding all three applicants disabled
for ADA purposes. In doing so, the court found that the protocol
"swept too broadly and was not significantly correlated with the
ability to drive safely" and that "less discriminatory alternatives
exist[ed] that would serve UPS's needs without diluting safety.'
195
The court also analyzed the basic qualifications of each applicant,
taking into account the fact that the drafter of UPS's own protocol
believed that "individuals without stereopsis could operate
commercial vehicles without danger" under certain circumstances.1
While the district court found Francis and Ligas unqualified for
driving jobs, it ordered UPS to move the third applicant, who had
failed the protocol because he had impaired vision in one eye, to the
company's advanced level of training and testing.1 97 Thus, when the
Ninth Circuit ruled on appeal that Francis and Ligas were not
actually disabled and then imposed a more stringent "regarded as"
test, the court shifted the focus of the case from the propriety of
UPS's policies to the applicants' right to question those policies. In
this regard, the effect of the court's ruling on the third applicant is
particularly unfortunate; the Ninth Circuit made it highly unlikely
that he would ever be able to present evidence of the overbreadth of
UPS's vision protocol on remand, even though the district court had
found him potentially qualified for a driving job with UPS. Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit never addressed any issues regarding the
applicants' qualifications or the necessity of the vision protocol, even
though the parties had raised such issues on appeal. Apparently,
the court had such confidence that all three applicants would be
found not "regarded as disabled" on remand that it viewed any
further analysis of the case as a wasteful exercise.
193. 149 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 37 (1989)).
194. Id. at 1159.
195. 306 F.3d at 800.
196. Id.
197. See 149 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
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The restricting effects of the Toyota standard are also apparent
in the Eighth Circuit case of Fenney v. Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern
Railroad Company.19 In Fenney, the court faced the question of
whether the plaintiff, who had limited use of his right arm and was
missing his right thumb and half his right middle finger,1 9  had
mustered enough evidence of a disability to defeat summary
judgment. The Toyota standard required this plaintiff to show that
his impairments "prevent[ed] or severely restrict[ed]" him in the
major life activity at issue: caring for oneself.2 o Under the EEOC's
"condition, manner, or duration" standard, evidence relating to the
manner in which the right-handed plaintiff managed to perform
tasks such as dressing, preparing meals, and shaving would have
been highly relevant, as would evidence regarding the amount of
time he required for these tasks. Indeed, the plaintiffs evidence
showed that he went about these acts in a very different manner
than do people who have the full use of both arms and hands, and
that he required significantly more time to perform them. 20 ' Thus,
under the EEOC standard, the plaintiff would have presented an
easy case for ADA coverage. Under the more restrictive Toyota
standard, however, the plaintiff just barely escaped summary
judgment on the issue of disability. The Eighth Circuit concluded
that the evidence of disability was "thin," but that it managed to
raise a factual issue as to whether his restrictions were sufficiently
202
severe.
The Fifth Circuit, in Waldrip v. General Electric Co.,203 has also
registered the restrictive effects of Toyota on the ADA's disability
definition. The case concerned a plaintiff with chronic pancreatitis,
who claimed that the disease substantially limited his major life
activities of eating and digesting. 4  In holding that the disease
satisfied the "impairment" element of the statutory definition, the
Fifth Circuit cited the EEOC disability regulations but was careful
to note that it did not accord them Chevron deference. The court
took its cue on this point from Toyota and other "recent decisions of
the Supreme Court [that] strongly suggest that the regulations are
not entitled to such deference." 20 ' Apparently, this lack of deference
198. 327 F.3d 707, 714 (8th Cir. 2003).
199. Id. at 710.
200. Id. at 714 (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S.
184, 198 (2002)) (italics added in Fenney).
201. Id. at 715-16.
202. Id. at 716.
203. 325 F.3d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 2003).
204. Id. at 655.
205. Id. at 655 n.1 (citing Toyota, 534 U.S. at 194; Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 563 n.10 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
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led the Fifth Circuit to ignore completely the EEOC's "substantially
limits" regulation. The court never cited the regulation and never
analyzed the plaintiffs activities in terms of condition, manner, or
duration. Instead, in analyzing whether the plaintiffs disease was
substantially limiting, the court cited Toyota for the proposition that
" [the effects of an impairment must be severe to qualify as a
disability under the ADA."20 6 Applying this standard, the court held
that the plaintiff was not disabled because the effects of his disease
were not always severe enough to cause him to miss work.
According to the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiffs occasional flare-ups
were merely temporary effects that did not meet the Supreme
Court's "exacting standard. 2 7 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit was
apparently lumping chronic pancreatitis in with "the countless
aches and pains from which most of us unhappily suffer."0 8
In addition to demonstrating a retreat from the EEOC's
"condition, manner, or duration" standard, all of the opinions
described above have applied the Toyota "prevents or severely
restricts" standard to cases involving major life activities other than
manual tasks, even though the Toyota Court stated explicitly that
its analysis applied only to that particular activity. Indeed, all of
the federal circuits explicitly addressing the issue have decided that
the Toyota "substantially limits" standard applies to all major life
activities across the board.210 These holdings have a certain logic:
Nothing in the ADA suggests that the meaning of the word
"substantially" would depend upon which major life activity is being
analyzed. Nevertheless, the application of the Toyota standard to
all major life activities simply highlights the perverse manner in
which the standard came about in the first place. The Supreme
Court in Toyota sidestepped the original EEOC definition of
"substantially limits" because that definition was generally
527 U.S. 471, 478-80 (1999)).
206. Id. at 655.
207. Id. at 656-57.
208. Id. at 654.
209. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 192-93 ("We granted certiorari to consider the
proper standard for assessing whether an individual is substantially limited in
performing manual tasks .... We express no opinion on the working, lifting, or
other arguments for disability status that ... were not ruled upon by the Court
of Appeals.") (internal citation omitted).
210. See, e.g., Mack v. Great Dane Trailers, 308 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 2002)
("We see no basis for confining Toyota's analysis to only those cases involving
the specific life activity asserted by the plaintiff in that case."); EEOC v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 802-03 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the Toyota
standard to the major life activity of seeing); Mulholland v. Pharmacia &
Upjohn, Inc, 52 Fed. Appx. 641, 644-45 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying the Toyota
analysis to the major life activity of learning).
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applicable to all activities and thus supposedly "silent" as to the
specific major life activity of performing manual tasks.2 Thus, for
no apparent reason, the Toyota Court implied that each major life
activity might require its own specific interpretation of
"substantially limits." Ironically, however, now that the circuit
courts are applying Toyota's new "substantially limits" definition
across the board, that definition has become nothing more than a
new general standard, applicable to all major life activities.
VI. SAVING THE LAST DANCE: SALVAGING WHAT'S LEFT OF THE
EEOC's DISABILITY REGULATIONS
Despite the retreat from the EEOC's "condition, manner, or
duration" standard described above, hope remains, even after
Toyota, for ADA plaintiffs who have learned to live with their
impairments by developing new and different ways of performing
major life activities. In this post-Toyota world, however, advocates
representing such plaintiffs may need to reassess or re-emphasize
certain strategies for demonstrating that their clients experience
substantial limitations and are thus disabled. The strategies below
represent the best course of action for such advocates at this point.
A. Continuing to Assert the Validity of the EEOC Regulations
Defining Disability
Once presented with the issue squarely, a federal appellate
court will most likely rule that the EEOC's disability regulations are
either valid legislative rules, entitled to Chevron deference, or that
they are interpretive rules that deserve a high degree of deference
under Skidmore.212 Indeed, as yet, the issue has not been presented
squarely to a federal appellate court primarily because litigants
have so often agreed, reasonably, to take the regulations as valid.218
Now that Toyota has interpreted the term "substantially limits" in
sharp contrast to the EEOC's standard, however, much more is
riding on the continued applicability of the EEOC standard than
ever before. As a result, litigants may have a new interest in
disputing or supporting the standard's validity. Once disability
rights advocates are pressed on this issue, their arguments are
likely to lead to the establishment of helpful precedent that both
reinvigorates the "condition, manner or duration" standard and,
simultaneously, limits the application of Toyota's narrower
"prevents or severely restricts" standard.
211. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Toyota, 534 U.S. at 194; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471, 480 (1999).
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B. Arguing that the Toyota Standard Should be Limited to Cases
Concerning the Major Life Activity of Performing Manual Tasks
Despite some circuits' extension of Toyota's "prevents or
severely restricts" standard to a variety of major life activities, 214 the
opinion by its own terms was limited to cases involving the
performance of manual tasks, as opposed to working, lifting, or
other activities.215 While no circuit has explicitly refused to apply
Toyota to cases involving other activities,2 1 at least one has done so
implicitly, and has thereby resuscitated the EEOC's "condition,
manner, or duration" standard.
In Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Service, Inc.,217 the First Circuit
addressed a claim of employment discrimination asserted by a
woman who had applied for a position as an emergency medical
technician ["EMT"]. The plaintiff, Kelly Gillen, was a "genetic
amputee" whose left arm ended a few inches below her elbow. ' 8
Despite her impairment, Ms. Gillen completed the necessary
214. See supra notes 178-210 and accompanying text.
215. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 192-93.
216. A few have continued to apply the EEOC standard, however. The
Tenth Circuit, for example, has expressly adopted the "substantially limits"
regulation as binding precedent and has invoked it, along with the Toyota
standard, in a recent case. See Velarde v. Associated Reg'l & Univ.
Pathologists, 61 Fed. Appx. 627, 629-30 (10th Cir. 2003). However, because the
plaintiff in that case presented no evidence indicating how his impairment
made him less able than the average person to perform specific activities, id. at
630, the court did not have occasion to apply the EEOC's "condition, manner, or
duration" test or to explain how it might relate to the Toyota standard.
Similarly, the Third Circuit, in explaining the "substantially limits"
element of the disability definition, has cited both the Toyota "prevents or
severely restricts" standard and the EEOC "condition, manner, or duration"
language back to back in the same paragraph. Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs.,
Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 569 (3d Cir. 2002).
Unfortunately, this opinion, too, fails to synthesize the two standards,
perhaps because the plaintiffs permanent and incurable multiple sclerosis
presented a fairly easy case on the disability issue that did not require long and
detailed analysis. The court devoted only a paragraph to the analysis of
whether the plaintiffs disease substantially limited her ability to concentrate
and remember. See id. at 569-70. In that paragraph, the court referred neither
to the EEOC's "condition, manner, or duration" language nor to Toyota's
"prevents or severely restricts" language. See id. In addition to the plaintiffs
strong medical evidence, the procedural posture of the case on appeal obviated
the need for a more detailed analysis of this issue. The appeal followed a jury
verdict for the plaintiff and a dismissal of the defendant's motion for judgment
as a matter of law, so the appellate court needed to decide only whether the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could support a
finding in the plaintiffs favor. See id. at 568.
217. 283 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002).
218. Id. at 17.
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training and passed both the written and practical portions of her
certification examination. She applied to Fallon Ambulance Service
for an EMT position, and the company offered her a job, contingent
upon her passing its physical exam.219 The examining physician
certified Ms. Gillen's health but told her that because of her
impairment, she would have to come back and take a strength test,
which would measure her ability to perform the lifting tasks
necessary to the job.22 Before she could return, however, the
physician's supervisor disqualified Ms. Gillen upon hearing of her
impairment and declared that the strength test would therefore be
unnecessary. Ms. Gillen filed a discrimination suit against Fallon
under the ADA. The United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts granted summary judgment to Fallon on the grounds
that Ms. Gillen was not disabled, and, at any rate, not qualified for
the EMT position.222 (Interestingly, while waiting for the First
Circuit to hear her appeal, Ms. Gillen found an EMT position with
another company, where she worked successfully for years with no
special accommodations.2 2 )
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment and put its own gloss on the Supreme Court's
recent questioning of the EEOC's authority to interpret the ADA's
disability definition. Leaving open the possibility of an implicit
delegation of authority, the First Circuit cited both Toyota and
Sutton for the proposition that "Congress did not explicitly delegate
authority to refine the meaning of [disability]" to any agency.224 The
court then spoke approvingly of the EEOC's rulemaking on this
topic, noting that the agency had "seized the initiative and
promulgated regulations aimed at clarifying the statutory
terminology."222 Thus, the court proceeded to apply the EEOC
"substantially limits" standard to Ms. Gillen, who was able to
perform many physical tasks despite her missing hand and forearm.
In setting forth its analysis, the court explained that a plaintiffs
219. Id. at 17-18.
220. Id. at 18.
221. Id. at 18-19.
222. Id. at 20.
223. Id. at 19.
224. Id. at 21 (emphasis added) (citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 479 (1999)). The word "explicitly" is the First Circuit's own gloss on the
Supreme Court's comment; it does not appear in the text of the pronouncement
in Toyota, see 534 U.S. at 194, or Sutton, see 527 U.S. at 479. Nevertheless, this
gloss represents one reasonable interpretation of the Court's language. See
supra Part III.C.
225. Gillen, 283 F.3d at 21.
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sheer ability to accomplish a given task is not dispositive of whether
she is disabled:
The focus is not on whether the individual has the courage to
participate in the major life activity despite her impairment,
but, rather, on whether she faces significant obstacles when
she does so. The EEOC's emphasis on "condition, manner, or
duration" in contrasting how a disabled person performs an
activity and how a member of the general public performs that
same activity dovetails with this formulation.
226
Thus, even though Ms. Gillen had trained herself to lift up to
ninety pounds with her one hand, the First Circuit still found that
the record could support a finding that she was substantially limited
in lifting and thus disabled. The court reasoned that even if she
could lift as much weight as some non-disabled individuals, her
ability to do so depended on "an array of techniques" she had
developed to compensate for her impairment.227 As a result, "the
manner in which she lifts and the conditions under which she can
lift will be significantly restricted because she only has one available
limb .,,228
Overall, in analyzing Ms. Gillen's impairment, the First Circuit
downplayed the effects of Toyota, Sutton, and other Supreme Court
precedent: "When all is said and done ... these decisions do not
alter the usual standard," which requires a plaintiff to "'proffer
evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that [a
major life] activity is substantially or materially limited.' 229 In
elaborating on this standard, the First Circuit explained that a
plaintiff would need to provide evidence of personal limitation, but
that such evidence "need not necessarily be composed of
excruciating details."2 0 As a result, Ms. Gillen's general diagnosis,
coupled with some evidence regarding her limited ability to use her
left arm, sufficed to allow her to avoid summary judgment on the
issue of disability.7 1
Significantly, the Gillen opinion never quotes Toyota's
characterization of a substantially limiting impairment as one that
"prevents or severely restricts" a major life activity. The First
226. Id. at 22.
227. Id. at 23.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 24 (alterations in original) (quoting Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr.,
128 F.3d 1201, 1207 (8th Cir. 1997)).
230. Id.
231. Id. The First Circuit also noted that Ms. Gillen had introduced
sufficient evidence to raise jury questions regarding her qualification for the
Fallon EMT job and Fallon's motivation for disqualifying her. See id. at 33.
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Circuit presumably ignored this language because it viewed the
Toyota standard as applicable only to the major life activity of
performing manual tasks. If so, then the Gillen court correctly
recognized that the EEOC's definition of "substantially limits"-
including its "condition, manner, or duration" language-should
apply generally to all other major life activities. Indeed, had the
Gillen court applied Toyota's "severe restriction" standard and
ignored the EEOC's focus on the condition and manner of the
plaintiffs ability of lift, it may well have affirmed summary
judgment for Fallon on the disability issue; a woman who can lift
ninety pounds is arguably not severely restricted in lifting, even if
she is missing her left forearm and hand. In addition, even the
second and third prongs of the disability definition may not have
applied to Ms. Gillen, if the First Circuit had interpreted those
prongs in light of Toyota. Under the second prong, Toyota would
have required Ms. Gillen to demonstrate a record of substantial
limitation-i.e., a severe restriction-in lifting for purposes of daily
life. Given her remarkable ability to compensate for her impairment
throughout her lifetime, this showing would have been difficult to
make. Similarly, under the definition's third prong, Toyota would
have required Ms. Gillen show that Fallon regarded her as being
severely restricted in lifting tasks for purposes of her daily life.Q
Although the company regarded her as unable to perform the heavy
lifting tasks required of an EMT, it apparently did not view her as
severely restricted with respect to everyday lifting tasks that most
people perform around the house. Thus, had the First Circuit in
Gillen filtered its analysis through the Toyota standard and de-
emphasized the EEOC's "condition, manner, or duration" analysis, it
likely would have concluded that a person with a missing hand and
forearm did not have a disability for purposes of the ADA. This
result would surely have contravened legislative intent regarding
the scope of the statute's coverage, even if it followed the literal
language of Toyota.23 3 Gillen thus demonstrates that, in many cases,
232. The Supreme Court has determined that the "regarded as" prong of the
definition should be read literally; under this literal reading, plaintiffs must
prove that some person regarded them as being unable to perform a major life
activity or severely restricted in performing it. See Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
233. While the ADA's legislative history does not specifically state that a
missing limb should ordinarily qualify as a disability, Congress clearly intended
an "anatomical loss" to qualify as an "impairment" for ADA purposes. See H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 450.
Surely the lack of a hand and forearm is one of the most limiting types of
anatomical loss. It is therefore difficult to imagine that Congress did not intend
such a loss to qualify as a disability.
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it may be not only possible 234 but critical for disabled plaintiffs to
persuade courts to favor the EEOC standard over the Toyota
standard in cases involving activities other than the performance of
manual tasks.
C. To the Extent that Toyota's "Prevents or Severely Restricts"
Standard Has Already Supplanted the EEOC Standard, Focusing
upon the "Record of" Prong of the ADA's Disability Definition
In federal circuits where Toyota's "prevents or severely
restricts" standard has already supplanted the EEOC's "condition,
manner or duration" standard, disabled plaintiffs will of course have
more difficulty proving that they have impairments that
substantially limit major life activities. In such a circuit, an ADA
plaintiff would have to prove under the first prong of the ADA's
disability definition the existence of an actual impairment that
prevented or severely restricted some specific major life activity.
The definition's third prong, which concerns perceived disabilities,
would not offer much help to such a plaintiff, because he or she
would still have to demonstrate that someone believed that the
plaintiff had an impairment that prevented or severely restricted
231
some specific major life activity.
The definition's second prong, however, might offer some hope
to a plaintiff in a circuit applying the strict Toyota standard. Under
the second prong, a plaintiff can prove a disability by demonstrating
that he or she has a record of an impairment that substantially
limited a major life activity.236 Even if Toyota would require a
plaintiff, under the "record of" prong, to show that the impairment
at one time prevented or severely restricted a major life activity,
many litigants might be able to overcome this obstacle. For
example, the plaintiff in Gillen231 may have been able to show that
her lack of a hand and forearm severely restricted her ability to lift
(and, perhaps, to perform other activities) before she trained herself
to lift and carry heavy loads with one hand. Similarly, the two job
234. Mark C. Weber has traced a pattern of repeated "retrenchment and
expansion" of disability rights among courts in recent decades, noting that
lower courts have often found ways to avoid the harsh repercussions of
restrictive Supreme Court holdings. See The Americans with Disabilities Act
and Employment: A Non-Restrospective, 52 ALA. L. REV. 375, 386 (2000). If
Professor Weber's observation continues to hold true, other courts may well join
the First Circuit in declining to apply Toyota's "prevents or severely restricts"
standard to cases involving major life activities other than the performance of
manual tasks.
235. See supra note 232.
236. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
237. See supra notes 217-31 and accompanying text.
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applicants in UPS,"' who suffered from monocularity, presumably
experienced severe restrictions in performing a wide variety of
activities before they trained themselves to make adjustments for
this vision impairment. Therefore, in circuits where the Toyota
standard reigns supreme, the "record of' prong may represent a
plaintiffs best hope of proving a disability.3 9
VII. CONCLUSION
A close examination of the EEOC's regulations defining
disability for purposes of Title I of the ADA, in light of applicable
administrative law principles, reveals that the regulations are not
only valid but also deserving of a high degree of deference. The
Supreme Court therefore acted inappropriately in Toyota when it
supplanted the regulations' "condition, manner or duration"
standard with the Court's own "prevents or severely restricts" test.
Fortunately, however, the Toyota holding leaves disability rights
advocates free to argue for the continued application of the broader
EEOC standard in a wide variety of distinguishable cases. Because
the EEOC standard, like all of its disability regulations, is the
product of a valid administrative rulemaking process, and because it
coincides with the broad remedial purpose of the ADA, disability
advocates would be foolish to abandon it as a mechanism for proving
disabled status.
238. See supra notes 182-97 and accompanying text.
239. Professor Bonnie Tucker has similarly suggested that the "record of"
prong may be the best means of proving a disability for a plaintiff who uses
mitigating measures to overcome the limiting effects of an impairment, now
that the Supreme Court in Sutton has held that courts must take the effects of
such measures into account when assessing substantial limitation. Tucker,
supra note 26, at 372.
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